This paper considers the implications of an important cognitive bias in information processing, con…rmation bias, in a political agency setting. When voters have this bias and when only the politician's actions are observable before the election, it decreases pandering by the incumbent, and can raise voter welfare as a consequence. This result is driven by the fact that the noise aspect of con…rmation bias, which decreases pandering, dominates the bounded rationality aspect, which increases it. The results generalize in several directions, including to the case where the voter can also observe payo¤s with some probability before the election. We identify conditions when con…rmation bias strengthens the case for decision-making by an elected rather than an appointed o¢cial.
We focus on the …rst form of bias, preferential treatment of given evidence; a complete study of selective exposure requires also the modelling of the supply of information e.g. by the media, and is beyond the scope of this paper. To model con…rmation bias, we adopt the approach of Rabin and Schrag (1999) , who assume that when the agent gets a signal that is counter to the hypothesis he currently believes is more likely, there is a positive probability that he misreads that signal as supporting his current hypothesis. Moreover, the agent is unaware that he is misreading the signal in this way, and consequently ignores the error when updating his prior.
To understand the e¤ect of con…rmation bias in this setting, it is helpful to note that the RabinSchrag formulation of con…rmation bias has two distinct elements; …rst, it introduces (biased) noise into the voter's observation of the action of the politician, and second, the voter is boundedly rational in the sense that she fails to take account of the noise when performing Bayesian updating. The question then is how each of these two elements a¤ect the degree of pandering in equilibrium. 4 Our main results are the following. First, the noise e¤ect tends to reduce pandering, whereas the bounded rationality e¤ect tends to increase it. Second, the bounded rationality e¤ect is always dominated by the noise e¤ect, so that overall, con…rmation bias reduces pandering. Third, the relative contributions of noise and bounded rationality turn on whether the voter only cares about the incumbent's quality of decision-making, or whether there is some other dimension of preference over candidates. In the …rst case, the re-election probability does not depend on exactly how the voter updates i.e. the re-election probability is one if the voter believes the incumbent is better than the challenger, and zero otherwise.
Then, the e¤ect of con…rmation bias on political equilibrium only works via the noise e¤ect, with bounded rationality playing no role.
However, if the voter has non-policy preferences, the re-election probability of the incumbent is a smooth function of the voter posterior belief, and then the bounded rationality element of con…rmation bias comes into play. In particular, bounded rationality makes the electoral return to pandering higher, because the voter ignores the noise in the signal of the politician's action, and thus updates as if the signal of the action were perfectly accurate.
We then turn to study voter welfare. As pandering generally has an ambiguous e¤ect on voter welfare, it is possible that an increase in con…rmation bias increases voter welfare, and we identify conditions under which this happens. We also consider the robustness of our results in several directions. First, we allow the voter to observe not only the action of the incumbent, but also, with some probability, the payo¤ before the election (Maskin and Tirole (2004) call this the "feedback" case), or indeed just the payo¤.
Second, we show that our basic argument applies in other leading models of electoral accountability, such as Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001) and Fox (2007) .
Finally, we revisit the choice between a politician and an unelected o¢cial, the focus of Maskin and Tirole's original paper. With voter con…rmation bias, when the choice between an elected and appointed o¢cial is not trivial, con…rmation bias always works in favour of the elected o¢cial; this is because bias reduces pandering. So, in policy areas where voter con…rmation bias is likely to be strong -perhaps where voters have strong prior beliefs -it is better, other things equal, to have elected o¢cials rather than non-elected o¢cials. This is broadly consistent with the observation that in the public policy arena, decisions concerning e.g. taxation are taken by politicians, whereas technical decisions, such as those concerning monetary policy or utility regulation, are usually taken by appointed o¢cials.
Related Literature
This paper is a contribution to a small but growing literature studying the implications of introducing behavioral and cognitive biases into rational choice models of voting. 5 The most closely related contribution is by Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) , who are the …rst to consider deviations from the full rationality of the voter in a political agency setting. In particular, they consider voters who in their words,"fail to …lter". This refers to the stylized fact that voters vote for or against the incumbent partly in response to events such natural disasters or economic shocks, or even changes in personal circumstances, that the voters should know are outside of the politicians' control. They model this by assuming that in addition to the policy payo¤ from the incumbent's action, the voter gets a random shock to his payo¤ from this exogenous event if he votes for the incumbent.
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In their setting, the "good" politician is a non-strategic type that always acts in the interests of the voters, and the "bad" politician is an extremist. Generally, an incumbent extremist chooses a policy which is more moderate than he would like in order to increase his chances of re-election. They then show that the random shock to voter preferences can, under some conditions, strengthen the link between policy moderation and re-election, thus inducing more moderation in equilibrium. In turn, this can raise voter welfare.
However, there are a number of di¤erences in our approaches. First, con…rmation bias is a distinct type of bias to failing to …lter, and the mechanism at work is di¤erent. The available evidence suggests that failure to …lter is probably driven by an a¤ective, rather than cognitive, process, namely a well-being spillover, where a random shock that increases income of well-being makes the voter better disposed to 5 Other contributions include Callander and Wilson (2006) , (2008) who introduce a theory of context-dependent voting, Ghirardato and Katz (2006) and Ellis (2016) on ambiguity aversion and voting, Alesina and Passarelli (2015) and Lockwood and Rockey (2016) on the e¤ect of loss aversion on direct democracy and electoral competition respectively, and Matµ ejka and Tabellini (2016) on rationally inattentive voters.
6 Analytically, the random shock assumed by Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) is similar to the preference parameter  in our model below. It is thus analytically distinct from con…rmation bias, which is modelled in our framework by the parameter  the incumbent. 7 Second, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) make the strong assumption that the "good" politician is a non-strategic type that always acts in the best interests of the voters i.e. has no re-election motive. This is an important restriction, because it means that they cannot analyze political pandering; rather, a strategic decision is only made by the bad incumbent, who must decide whether to imitate i.e. pool with, the good incumbent or not.
Third, for conditions under which failing to …lter can improve voter welfare, identi…ed in their Proposition 4, the mechanism at work is the reverse to ours. Speci…cally, they …nd that the incentive for the bad incumbent (the extremist in their model) to imitate the good one (the moderate) can be stronger under a fail-to-…lter voter than under a rational voter, and so failing to …lter buys the voter better discipline of the incumbent at the cost of worse selection. In contrast, as described above, we …nd that con…rmation bias implies less pandering but better selection. So, overall, the results of this paper are complementary to theirs.
Our paper is also close in spirit to Levy and Razin (2015) , who …nd that the cognitive bias of correlation neglect can improve outcomes for voters, due to a second-best argument; in their setting, information aggregation via voting is initially ine¢cient, because voters underweight their information when deciding how to vote. If a voter ignores the fact that two of her signals are correlated, she will "overweight" the signals, and thus put more weight on her information, o¤setting the original distortion. However, both the institutions and the mechanism at work are completely di¤erent. They consider direct democracy i.e. a referendum on two alternatives, and correlation neglect causes individuals base their vote more on their information rather than on their preferences.
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The last related literature is the one that studies the e¤ects of additional voter information on equilibrium outcomes in political agency models when the voter is fully rational. Speci…cally, there are a number of papers showing that additional information may not be to the bene…t of voters, because it may induce a strategic response by the incumbent politician, and in turn, this strategic response may weaken either the selection or discipline e¤ects of elections (Prat (2005) , Besley (2006) and Fox (2007) ). For example, Prat (2005) makes this point in a general agency model where the agent varies in competence; starting from a baseline where the principal can only observe the payo¤ from the action of the agent, allowing the principal to observe the action as well can make the principal worse o¤, as it induces the bad agent to pool with the good one, and thus worsens selection. However, unlike this paper, all these contributions assume full rationality of voters.
The Set-Up
Our set-up is a variant of Maskin and Tirole (2004) . While this is not the only model of political pandering, it has the advantage of being well-known and relatively simple. We argue in Section 5 below that our main insights extend to two other well-known models of political pandering, Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), and Fox (2007) .
A single voter lives for periods  = 1 2 In each of the two periods, a politician chooses a binary policy   2 f g. The …rst-period incumbent faces an election at the end of his …rst term of o¢ce, where the voter can either re-elect the incumbent or elect a challenger The payo¤s of voters and politicians depend on the action and a state of the world   2 f g All agents i.e. incumbent, voter, and challenger have a prior belief 1    05 that state  will occur.
Payo¤s
The voter gets a policy-related payo¤ in period  which is 1 if the incumbent's action in period  matches the state, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, if the voter elects the challenger at the end of period 1, the voter gets a non-policy related payo¤  2 < which measures for example, attractiveness or the valence of the challenger relative to the incumbent, as in Morelli and van Weelden (2013) . 9 We assume that  is determined by random draw from a continuous distribution  that is symmetric around zero. The role of  is to smooth the response of the re-election probability to voter beliefs.
Following Maskin and Tirole (2004) , we assume that politicians get zero payo¤ when out of o¢ce, and enjoy an exogenous ego-rent  when in o¢ce; they also care about policy choices when in o¢ce.
Politicians are of two types, consonant, denoted  and dissonant, denoted  10 The incumbent and challenger types are independent draws from the same distribution, where the probability of a consonant type is   05 All the results of this paper extend to the case where   05 but allowing for both cases considerably complicates the formal de…nition of con…rmation bias.
Congruent politicians, when in o¢ce, get utility
. random variables with a continuous distribution  on support [0 ] So, they share the same basic preferences as voters, but can vary in the extent to which they value an action that matches the state.
Dissonant politicians, when in o¢ce, get   if   6 =    and 0 if   =   . We assume without loss of 9 The problem with the second interpretation is that the valence must be unknown to the incumbent himself until after the action is taken (Morelli and van Weelden (2013) ). Some may …nd this assumption implausible. 10 The terminology "congruent" and "dissonant" is taken from Besley (2006) . It is a little more memorable than the Maskin and Tirole (2004) terminology of "congruent" and "non-congruent". generality that [  ] = 1 and we assume   (1 + ) This inequality ensures that for some values of  1  the incumbent prefers not to pander even at the cost of not being re-elected.
The reason why we assume that politicians' payo¤s from their most preferred outcome are determined by random draw (rather than being …xed at 1, as in Maskin and Tirole) is twofold. First, this ensures uniqueness of equilibrium, as explained in Section 2.5 below. Second, it ensures that in all cases,   is an informative, but not perfect signal of politician type, so that the Rabin-Schrag de…nition of con…rmation bias can be applied.
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Finally, both voter and the incumbent discount second-period payo¤s by 
Order of Events and information Structure
The timing of events and the information available to each player at each stage is as follows. Note that we assume, following Maskin and Tirole (2004) , that the voter observes the action  1 before election, but not the payo¤ generated by  1  In Section 4 below, we instead assume that the voter observes his payo¤  1  or both  1   1  rather than  1 .
The Second Period
To de…ne con…rmation bias in the simplest way, it is helpful to reduce the model to a one-period game between the incumbent and the voter by solving out for the second period. This is of course, consistent with solving the model for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In the second period, consonant (dissonant) politicians match the action to the state according to their preferences i.e. consonant politicians choose  2 =  2  and dissonant politicians choose  2 6 =  2  Thus, both types of politicians have an expected continuation payo¤ from election of ([ 2 ] + ) = (1 + )´ Moreover, as a consonant (resp. dissonant) incumbent generates a payo¤ of 1 (resp. 0) for the voter in the second period, the voter's expected payo¤ from re-electing the incumbent is just equal to the posterior probability that he is consonant, and his expected payo¤ to electing the challenger is  + .
Armed with these descriptions of the the second-period continuation payo¤s of the actors, we can now focus entirely on the …rst period, and so we can drop time subscripts without ambiguity. So,    now refer to  1   1   etc.
Modelling Con…rmation Bias
Rabin and Schrag de…ne con…rmation bias in a single-person decision problem, where the decision-maker (agent) gets noisy signals about a payo¤-relevant state of the world. They assume that "when the agent gets a signal that is counter to the hypothesis he currently believes is more likely, there is a positive probability that he misreads that signal as supporting his current hypothesis. The agent is unaware that he is misreading evidence in this way and engages in Bayesian updating that would be fully rational given his environment if he were not misreading evidence" (Rabin and Schrag (1999) , p 48).
To extend this de…nition, we …rst need to identify what is the payo¤-relevant state of the world, and the signal, for the voter. At the time when the voter acts i.e. votes, the payo¤-relevant state of the world is the type of the incumbent, because that is persistent by assumption, and thus determines the expected payo¤ of the voter in the next period. Also by assumption, the only thing observed by the voter before the election is the action  so this is the signal.
The complication here is that the link between the state of the world, thus de…ned, and the signal, is generated by equilibrium play of the game between incumbent and voter. This is in contrast to Rabin and Schrag (1999)'s set-up where the link between the signal and the state of the world is exogenous.
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This, of course, creates a possible problem of circularity -the de…nition of con…rmation bias depends on the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent, which in turn may depend on the de…nition of con…rmation bias.
To deal with this, we will de…ne con…rmation bias conditional on incumbent choices, and then make con…rmation bias part of the de…nition of equilibrium. Speci…cally, de…ne      to be the unconditional probabilities that type   incumbents respectively choose action  in period 1 Note that these probabilities are not conditional on   and are therefore typically between zero and one even though conditional on   the incumbent is assumed to play a pure strategy i.e. to choose  2 f g. Then, following Rabin and Schrag (1999) , voter con…rmation bias can be de…ned as follows.
13 12 The formal de…nition of Rabin and Schrag (1999) is the following. Assume a binary state of the world,  = f g and sequence  = 1  of informative signals  2 f g about the state, where Pr( =  j =  ) =   05 If  is the decision-maker's prior that the state is  at  then: (i) if   05 the agent misreads  =  as  =  with probability  and (ii) if    05 the agent misreads   =  as   =  with probability  13 We rule out the borderline case where  = 05; in this case, Rabin and Schrag assume no con…rmation bias i.e.  = 0 So, this case, apart from being non-generic, is also uninteresting. De…nition 1. Con…rmation Bias Conditional on Incumbent Choices. If       the voter misreads  =  as  =  with probability   0 If       then the voter misreads  =  as  =  with probability   0 Moreover, when the voter updates his beliefs, he ignores these errors.
To interpret this de…nition, note that as   05 the voter's "current hypothesis", in the sense of Rabin and Schrag, is that the incumbent is consonant and so the voter is biased in favor of mis-reading negative signals as positive signals. The de…nition says that if choice of action  is a positive signal of the incumbent being consonant i.e.      , the voter misreads a signal that the incumbent is dissonant ( = ) as a signal that the incumbent is consonant ( = ) with probability . On the other hand, if      , positive and negative signals are reversed i.e.  =  is now a signal that the incumbent is consonant. Conditional on this reversal, however, the voter still misreads a signal that the incumbent is dissonant as a signal that the incumbent is consonant with probability .
A very helpful way of modelling the misreading of action  in De…nition 1 is to think of the voter as observing a noisy and biased signal of  Speci…cally, we de…ne the signal  2 f g of  as follows.
De…nition 2. The Signal  If       () =  with probability 1, () =  with probability  and
with probability 1, and () =  with probability  and () =  otherwise.
Then, comparing De…nitions 1 and 2, it is clear that con…rmation bias is formally equivalent to (i) the voter observing  rather than  and (ii) believing that he has observed  i.e. ignoring the noise in  when he updates his beliefs about the quality of the incumbent. We call this last feature boundedly rational updating. This characterisation will be very useful in what follows.
Finally, when it comes to politician behavior, we will assume that the politician understands that the voter has con…rmation bias, and takes this into account when making his policy choices. This seems a reasonable assumption; in modern politics, political parties conduct extensive research into voter attitudes and behavior (Gibson and Römmele (2009) 
Equilibrium Concept
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibrium in what follows, which we call just a political equilibrium. It is understood in this de…nition that as part of (i), the voter updates in a boundedly rational way.
We close with a de…nition of pandering which follows Maskin and Tirole (2004) . The incumbent is said to pander if he chooses the action matching the state that the voter believes is ex ante more likely whatever the actual state of the world. As   05 pandering in the …rst period is therefore a choice of  =  for  =   A central concern of the analysis will be the probability of pandering by the incumbent in equilibrium.
The Rational Voter With Noise
To proceed, it is now helpful to introduce the idea of the rational voter with a noisy signal (the rational voter with noise for short, denoted the RN voter). Like the voter with con…rmation bias (the CB voter for short), the RN voter observes  But, the RN voter updates his prior belief  in a fully rational way, taking into account that  is de…ned as above in De…nition 2, whereas the CB voter updates his prior ignoring this i.e. assumes that  = 
The rational voter with noise is just an intermediate construct which allows us the distinguish the noise and bounded rationality e¤ects of con…rmation bias on political equilibrium. In what follows, we characterize equilibrium separately for RN and CB voters. This will enable us to decompose the e¤ects of the two components of con…rmation bias on the level of pandering in equilibrium. The de…nition of equilibrium for the RN voter is exactly as above, except it is now understood that in part (i), given  the RN voter updates in a fully rational way.
Con…rmation Bias and Pandering

Political Equilibrium
We give a brief informal description of the structure of the equilibrium before stating our main results.
Let   ()   () be the posterior belief that the incumbent is consonant for the RN and CB voters respectively, having observed signal  2 f g as de…ned above The formulae for these are given in the Appendix. Note that because the voter gets a payo¤ of one in the second period if the politician is consonant and zero otherwise, the voter of type  =   will re-elect the incumbent, having observed  =   if and only if the di¤erence in perceived quality between the incumbent and challenger,   ()¡ exceeds the non-policy preference for the challenger  i.e.
This voting rule generates re-election probabilities for the incumbent, conditional on actions, of
So, the incumbent clearly faces a choice of whether to pander i.e. always choose  =  or to take the short-run optimal action. These two objectives only con ‡ict when  is not short-run optimal for the incumbent. In that case, the opportunity cost of pandering is  the bene…t from the short-run optimal action, whether the incumbent is consonant or dissonant
The bene…t of pandering is the second-period continuation payo¤,  times the increase in the re-
bene…t of ¢   So, the incumbent will pander if and only if  · ¢   giving a pandering probability of   =  (¢   )  =  Note that this probability   is the same for both consonant and dissonant incumbents, as they both have the same continuation payo¤. So, our main focus will be on the pandering probability     =  
We are now ready to state our …rst result 15 .
Proposition 1. Assume voters have no non-policy preferences (´0). Then, there is a unique political equilibrium where: (a) the voter re-elects the incumbent i¤  =  whether the voter is a RN or CB type; (b) both incumbent types pander with probability
There are three notable features of this equilibrium. First, without con…rmation bias, the probability of pandering is of course  0´ ( ) so the presence of con…rmation bias lowers the probability of pandering from  ( ) to  ((1 ¡ ) ) Second, the equilibrium is the same whether the voter is a RN type or a CB type; in other words, the bounded rationality aspect of con…rmation bias has no e¤ect on the outcome. Third, voter behavior is consistent with      ; that is, the voter of either type correctly believes that the  type is more likely to choose  and consequently re-elects the incumbent only if
The reason why  depends on  is the following. In equilibrium, we know
but () =  because if  =  the voter will re-elect the incumbent anyway with probability , having observed an incorrect signal  =  So, the increase in the probability of re-election from choosing  =  rather than  =  is just 1 ¡  smaller than in the baseline case of a rational voter without any noise;
in the latter case, the increase in the probability of re-election is from zero to one.
We call this the mis-classi…cation e¤ect of con…rmation bias, as it arises because the voter mis-classi…es the action. So, when voters have no policy preferences, the conclusion is that the presence of con…rmation bias lowers the probability of pandering from  ( ) to  ((1 ¡ ) ) due to the mis-classi…cation e¤ect only.
If the voter does have non-policy preferences, this is no longer the case; bounded rationality comes into play. We now assume that the distribution of  has large enough support so that the probability of being re-elected is always strictly between zero and one. Assuming that  is distributed in [¡ ]  it is easily seen from (1) that this requires   max f 1 ¡ g  Then, the increase in the re-election probability from pandering can be shown to be
if the incumbent faces a RN or CB voter respectively.
Here the new term ¢()  1 measures the dampening of the voter's response to observing  rather than  due to the fact that the voter now trades o¤ a non-policy preference for the incumbent versus the challenger against the increase in incumbent quality signalled by observing  In full, ¢() is;
where in turn,      are de…ned in (A4) of the Appendix. Note also that ¢() is decreasing in  implying that ¢()  ¢(0) and thus ¢   ¢  . This is because for the RN voter, the sensitivity of the posterior belief   () to the signal  is lower, the higher  because the RN voter knows that the signal is more noisy and therefore weights it less. For the CB voter, there is no adjustment of updating to  because of the boundedly rational updating e¤ect.
We can now state:
Proposition 2. Assume the voter has non-policy preferences. If the voter is a RN type, there is a unique political equilibrium where: (a) the incumbent is re-elected i¤   () ¡ ¸; (b) both consonant and dissonant incumbents pander with probability
there is a unique political equilibrium where (a) the incumbent is re-elected i¤   () ¡ ¸; (b) both consonant and dissonant incumbents pander with probability
So, we see that if voters do have non-policy preferences, the picture is more complex. For both voter types, the mis-classi…cation e¤ect is present, but for the CB voter, the boundedly rational updating e¤ect also comes into play. So now, there are two opposing e¤ects at work; the mis-classi…cation e¤ect reduces pandering, but the boundedly rational updating e¤ect increases pandering. To see this, note that as
that is, the incumbent is more likely to pander if the voter is a CB type and thus boundedly rational.
The next question is which of these two e¤ects dominates. The obvious baseline is the equilibrium level of pandering that occurs when there is no con…rmation bias i.e.  = 0 which is
given that   =  (¢(0)(1 ¡ ) ) overall, with con…rmation bias, equilibrium pandering decreases i.e.
    0  To put it another way, the mis-classi…cation e¤ect always dominates the boundedly rational updating e¤ect.
Next, given that the mis-classi…cation e¤ect dominates, it is interesting to know by how much; are they of roughly equal size, or is the mis-classi…cation e¤ect much larger? To investigate this, we report some numerical simulations in Table 1 below. 17 These simulations take into account the fact that
The equilibrium levels of pandering      are reported, along with the baseline equilibrium level of 
We can note the following from the Table. First, as  rises, the mis-classi…cation e¤ect becomes stronger, and as expected, this reduces the probability of pandering i.e.   falls. Also, the bounded rationality e¤ect is small relative to the mis-classi…cation e¤ect; for example, when  = 09 the latter can drastically reduce the pandering probability, down from around 0.6 to around 0.06, but the bounded rationality e¤ect only pushes the probability back up by about 0.01. However, it can be shown that when   05 the boundedly rational updating e¤ect can almost o¤set the mis-classi…cation e¤ect.
Welfare
We now turn to consider the e¤ect of changes in con…rmation bias  on welfare. The de…nition of welfare is not straightforward in this case; should it be calculated taking into account the behavioral bias of the voter or not? In the literature on behavioral economics, the focus has been on objective measures of welfare, abstracting from behavioral biases. For example, in their study of decision-making with hyperbolic discounting, O'Donoghue and argue that "Since present-biased preferences 17 The details of these simulations are in the Not-for Publication Appendix. are often meant to capture self-control problems, where people pursue immediate grati…cation on a day-to-day basis, we feel the natural perspective in most situations is the long-run perspective", and their consequently their welfare criterion is the decision-maker utility without present bias. A similar assumption is made in Bernheim and Rangel's (2004) study of addiction.
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So, following these studies, our baseline measure of welfare will be an objective measure, taking into account that the signal  is noisy. However, there is also some interest in calculating the welfare of the voter who has con…rmation bias but is not aware of it. For example, a society that is composed entirely of voters with con…rmation bias would make decisions based on this criterion.
Call these two measures objective and subjective welfare respectively. It will turn out that the only di¤erence between the two is that the subjective welfare calculation overestimates the selection bene…t from elections, as it assumes that the decision whether or not to replace the incumbent is based on perfectly accurate information.
To make the comparison as clearly as possible, we focus on the case ´0 where we know from Proposition 1 that the behavior of the politician in equilibrium is the same whether the voter is a CB type or an RN type i.e. he panders with probability  =  ( (1¡)) Then, in the Appendix, we establish the following formula for objective welfare of the voter:
Formula (4) is composed of three parts. The …rst, (1 + ) is baseline welfare, which is the present value payo¤ of the voter if the incumbent did not face an election -in this case, he produces utility of 1 for the voter with probability  in both periods. The second term, ( ¡ ) measures the period 1 gain if the incumbent panders rather than chooses his short-run optimal action; with pandering,  =  is always chosen by the incumbent, and is the correct action with probability  whereas if the incumbent does not pander, he chooses the correct action only if he is consonant, which occurs with probability .
Finally, the last term captures the selection bene…t of elections.
Now consider the e¤ect of changing  on objective welfare. First, there is a direct e¤ect of ; holding the pandering probability  …xed,   is clearly decreasing in  This is because con…rmation bias makes selection of a good candidate at the election more unlikely, in turn because  is becomes a noisier signal of incumbent type as  rises.
Second, there is also an indirect e¤ect on   via the e¤ect of  on  To compute the indirect e¤ect,  from (4) to get
where  = (1 ¡ )(2 ¡ 1)  0 So, we see that there are two components to the indirect e¤ect. An increase in  reduces pandering, which causes a change  ¡  in welfare. Also, an increase in  improves the probability that a bad incumbent is detected and replaced by a good incumbent at the election i.e.
an increase in  leads to better selection. So, overall, the indirect e¤ect of  on   is strictly positive if
¸
Moving to subjective welfare, this can be expressed as:
Not that it is identical to (4) except that the voter ignores the e¤ect of the noisy signal on the gain from selection. So, in this case,  only a¤ects   via the indirect e¤ect on  and so the e¤ect of  on   is positive if ¸ Given this discussion, it is then straightforward to establish su¢cient conditions for increased con…r-mation bias  to increase welfare.
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Proposition 3. An increase in con…rmation bias  raises objective welfare if ¸ and the elasticity
 ln(1¡)¸1  An increase in con…rmation bias  raises subjective welfare if ¸; no elasticity condition is required.
Note from Proposition 1 that the elasticity condition is required to ensure that the positive indirect e¤ect on selection dominates the negative direct e¤ect. Using  =  ((1 ¡ ) ) it can be rewritten as a condition
For example,  is uniform, i.e.  () =  this reduces to 2(1 ¡ )¸. We have assumed    but these two conditions are consistent as long as  · 05
Observable Payo¤s
The assumption that the voter only observes actions before voting is a strong one. It may be appropriate for choice of e.g. an infrastructure project, which may be initiated but not completed before an election.
It is less plausible for policies that immediately impact voters' income and well-being, such as changes in tax rates. The question then is whether payo¤ observability a¤ects our results.
Assume …rst that the voter only observes his …rst-period payo¤  1 2 [0 1] in in our model, and not the action, before the election, as in Besley (2006) . 20 In this case, our de…nition of con…rmation bias can be straightforwardly extended. To do this, we note that if re-elected, the both consonant and dissonant incumbents have continuation payo¤s of  = (1 + ) as before and the voter prefers to re-elect a consonant incumbent, as before. So, we now drop time subscripts without ambiguity, as we are only concerned with what happens in the …rst period.
Let      be the probabilities that types  and  respectively generate a payo¤ of 1 for the voter in the …rst period. Then we can modify De…nition 1 as follows:
De…nition 3. Con…rmation Bias Conditional on Payo¤s. If       then the voter misreads  = 0 as  = 1 with probability   0 If       then the voter misreads  = 1 as  = 0 with probability   0
Moreover, when the voter updates his beliefs, he ignores these errors.
The de…nition says that if the observed payo¤  is a positive signal of the incumbent being consonant i.e.      , the voter misreads a signal that the incumbent is dissonant ( = 0) as a signal that the incumbent is consonant ( = 1) with probability . On the other hand, if      , positive and negative signals are reversed i.e.  = 0 is now a signal that the incumbent is consonant. Conditional on this reversal, however, the voter still misreads a signal that the incumbent is dissonant as a signal that the incumbent is consonant with probability .
As in the observable action case, it is very helpful to think of the voter with con…rmation bias observing a noisy and biased signal  2 f0 1g of  de…ned as follows De…nition 4. The Signal  If       (1) = 1 with probability 1, (0) = 1 with probability  and (0) = 0 otherwise. If       then (0) = 0 with probability 1, and (1) = 0 with probability  and (1) = 1 otherwise.
Moreover, as before, the voter with con…rmation bias, having e¤ectively observed  rather than  updates in a boundedly rational way i.e. as if he observed  rather than  Write (      ) to emphasize that  depends on        Then, a political equilibrium is comprised of; (i) a voter decision to elect the incumbent or challenger conditional on (      ) ; (ii) incumbent choices of  2 f g conditional on incumbent type and state of the world, which maximize incumbent payo¤s given the voting rule (i); (iii) probabilities      that are consistent with incumbent choices. It is understood in this de…nition that as part of (i), the voter updates in a boundedly rational way.
Finally, in this section, we focus on the baseline case where ´0; all the results in this section extend in a routine way to allowing for a non-policy preference for the voter.
When the voter only observes payo¤s, and not actions, then the structure of equilibrium is very di¤erent. In particular, in equilibrium, the consonant incumbent always acts in his short-run interest, thus always generating a payo¤ of 1 for the voter and always being re-elected. The dissonant incumbent will, in equilibrium, imitate, or pool with, the consonant incumbent with some probability. In fact, we can show:
Proposition 4. Assume that the voter only observes his payo¤ before the election. Then, whatever the type of the voter, there is a unique political equilibrium where ; (a) the voter re-elects the incumbent i¤  = 1; (b) the consonant type chooses  =   =   with probability 1, and the dissonant type imitates him with probability   =  ((1 ¡ ) ); (c) the consonant incumbent is more likely to generate a payo¤ of 1 for the voter i.e.      .
A …rst implication of this Proposition is that the imitation probability   is decreasing in voter con…rmation bias, a similar …nding to the observable action case. What is the e¤ect of con…rmation bias on welfare? Using argument very similar to the derivation of (4), we can show that in this case, the objective welfare of the voter is:
Formula (7) is composed of three parts. The …rst, (1 + ) is baseline welfare, which is the present value payo¤ of the voter if the incumbent did not face an election. The second term, (1 ¡ )   measures the …rst-period bene…t to the voter from imitation in the event that the incumbent is dissonant. Finally, the last term captures the selection bene…t of elections. Note that for a …xed imitation probability, it is decreasing in  as con…rmation bias makes selection more noisy.
where now  = (1¡)  0 Since (1¡)  (1¡) we see that    0 This is for the following reason. First, increasing  worsens selection directly. Second, increasing  lowers the imitation probability    which worsens discipline but improves selection. However, as (1 ¡ )  1 the discipline e¤ect always dominates.
If we consider subjective welfare    this is the same as   except without the term 1 ¡  so now there is no direct e¤ect of  on welfare. However, the fact that the discipline e¤ect dominates the welfare e¤ect again implies that   is decreasing in  So, it appears that contrary to the observable action case, con…rmation bias appears to always reduce welfare. However, our model is very stylized. In richer models of observable payo¤s, imitation can be welfare-reducing and so in those settings, con…rmation bias can be good for the voter. For example, Besley and Smart (2007) present such a model. A simpler and more ad hoc case where this can happen is where there are two periods after the election, rather than one. In this case, the weight  on the last term in (7) becomes (1 + ) and then we see that after collecting terms in  ()    can be re-written:
Moreover, note that the value of o¢ce in the de…nition of   in Proposition 4 is now  = (1 + )(1 + ) Then, it is easy to …nd a distribution  () and other parameters for which this derivative is positive. 21 So, we see that it is also possible that con…rmation bias can increase welfare when only payo¤s are observable.
One might ask what happens if both actions and payo¤s are observed. To frame this question, suppose that voter always observes the action, as in the baseline case, but that with probability  he also observes the payo¤ as well. Maskin and Tirole (2004) call this the case of pandering with feedback. Then, in the Online Appendix at the end of this paper, we show the following 22 .
If   05 there is an equilibrium with a similar structure to Proposition 4, where the consonant incumbent always matches the action to the state and the dissonant incumbent imitates him with prob- On the other hand, if   05 there can be an equilibrium with pandering. To get a tight characterization of equilibrium, we need to assume that  is uniformly distributed, i.e.  () =  Then, there is a  · 05 such that as long as    there is an equilibrium where the dissonant and consonant types pander with probabilities
respectively. 23 So, when  is not too high, there is an equilibrium similar to the baseline case in Proposition 1, where both types pander with positive probability. Moreover, the pandering by either type is decreasing in voter con…rmation bias, as before. 21 For example,  () =  and if  = 1 then 1 ¡   can be made arbitrarily small by setting  = 2(1 + ) +  and
A formal de…nition of con…rmation bias when both actions and payo¤s are observed is also given in this Appendix. 23 It is shown in the Not-for-Publication Appendix that
Note from (9) that when   0 the consonant incumbent panders less than the dissonant one.
Indeed, when  ' 05 he hardly panders at all. This is because when payo¤s are observed, the consonant incumbent can more accurately signal his type via the payo¤ he achieves for the voter, rather than the action he chooses.
Moreover, for  ·  welfare can be increasing in  con…rmation bias. In the Online Appendix, we compute a formula for objective welfare as a function of    () as in Section 3.2. Figure 1 below reports some simulations using this formula. The shaded area in Figure 1 below shows parameter combinations (  ) for which welfare is higher with con…rmation bias i.e. for which   ()    (0) for  = 01 09 So, apart from  the key parameters that we vary are  the probability of observing the payo¤, and  the degree of initial bias in favour of  = 
We assume  () = 6 and  =  = 1  = 075 For the parameter values chosen, = 05
We can see that as expected, conditional on  welfare is more likely to be higher with conformation bias when  is small. Also, conditional on  welfare is more likely to be higher with conformation bias when  is small. This is because when    the welfare change due to lower pandering is positive.
Finally, welfare is more likely to be higher with conformation bias when  is small, as when  is very large, the ine¢ciency due to decreased accuracy of selection via elections plays an important role in decreasing welfare.
Other Models of Electoral Accountability
As mentioned in Section 1, there are several other leading models of pandering that might have been used as the vehicle for our analysis. Here, we argue that our basic insights are robust to two of these other models. We begin with the model of Fox (2007) . The main di¤erence between Fox's model and the one of this paper is that in the former, the "bad" politician no longer wishes to take the action opposite to that preferred to the voter, but always prefers action  whatever the state. 24 Suppose for convenience that his payo¤ from doing so is always unity. It could be argued that this is a more realistic kind of non-congruence than in Maskin-Tirole model, because here, the "bad" politician is simply dogmatic, or stubborn, rather than always opposed to the electorate. Call this bad politician a type  (for biased, or one who always prefers alternative ) It is easily checked that the argument establishing Proposition 1 is virtually unchanged when the bad politician is type  rather that type  In fact, the only change to voter behavior is that the policy payo¤ to re-electing a  type is now 1 ¡  as he will choose the right decision when the state of the world is  rather than zero with a  type. So, the expected payo¤ to electing a politician who is judged to be good with probability  is  + (1 ¡ )(1 ¡ ) = 1 ¡  +  and consequently, the re-election rule (1) becomes
So, if ´0 the behavior of the voter is the same as in the Maskin-Tirole model, and so Proposition 1 continues to hold.
When  is stochastic (10) implies that ¢() is modi…ed by multiplying each argument of () in (3) by  So, Proposition 2 continues to hold, with the de…nition of ¢() appropriately modi…ed.
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The other leading model of pandering is that of Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Schotts (2001), where the politicians di¤er in competence, rather than in preferences, with the good incumbent observing a perfect signal of the state, and the bad incumbent only observing a noisy signal of the state. Their model is quite rich, with a number of elements not included here; namely, voters may observe the state directly with some probability, and the ex ante quality of the incumbent may be di¤erent to that of the challenger.
Here, we study a stripped-down version of their model without these elements, but retaining the features of our baseline model. 
The -type has a more accurate signal than the -type i.e. 1¸      05 In all other respects, the model is like the baseline model. 24 A minor di¤erence is that the "noise" that smooths incumbent behavior is not a random payo¤ from choosing the most preferred action in any period, but a random payo¤ from holding o¢ce. However, this just changes minor details in the algebra.
25 the only di¤erence to the structure of equilibrium is that the ¡type never chooses  =  unless he panders, so his probability of choosing is   = . So, the crucial condition for equilibrium,       still holds.
26 Even in the stripped-down version, the pandering equilibrium in the original Canes-Wrone, Herron and Schotts model has a complex structure, with both the incompetent politician and the voter randomizing. Our stochastic payo¤  implies the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium with a simpler structure.
The key di¤erence from the baseline model is that now, the continuation payo¤ of the incumbent depends on his type. In particular, in the second period, the incumbent of type  can do no better than to match the action to the signal, and so chooses the "right" state with probability    Therefore, he has a continuation payo¤
show that Proposition 1 continues to hold, but with the pandering probability being type-dependent i.e.
Note that the more competent type is more likely to pander i.e.       So, in equilibrium, as in the baseline case, the probability that the ¡type chooses action     is greater than the same probability for the ¡type,   
27
In the case where  is stochastic the equilibrium is also much as in the baseline case. The voter re-election rule is still (1), but the details of the computation of   () are slightly di¤erent. However, the basic conclusion that the noise and boundedly rational updating e¤ects move in opposite directions, with the former dominating, are qualitatively unchanged.
The Politician and the Judge Revisited
Here, we address the issue of how voter con…rmation bias a¤ects the choice between elected and appointed o¢cials. This choice has been addressed in Maskin and Tirole (2004) , as well as in several subsequent papers (e.g. Iaryczower et. al. (2013) , Lim (2013) ). However, to our knowledge, there is no existing study of how behavioral biases a¤ect this choice.
The appropriate measure of voter welfare, as argued above, is objective welfare. Voter welfare from an appointed o¢cial is simply (1 + ) as the o¢cial will match the action to the state in both periods if and only if he is consonant. Welfare with an elected o¢cial has already been calculated in (4). So, the welfare gain to an elected o¢cial is easily seen to be
where
Note that if ¸ an elected o¢cial is always at least weakly preferred to an appointed one, whatever  because the pandering and selection e¤ects on welfare are both positive. So, on issues where voters have a strong prior about what is the "right" policy (  ) from (11), a politician always dominates a judge, but this advantage may increase or decrease with con…rmation bias, as   can be increasing or decreasing in .
27 It is easy to check that the probability that the ¡type chooses action  in the …rst period in equilibrium is:
The other case is where    In this case, from (11), the e¤ect of a change in con…rmation bias on the relative advantage of an elected o¢cial is thus
where the second line follows from an argument as in Section 3.2 and  = ¡  ln(1¡)
 ln(1¡)  So, we see that starting from an initial position where a judge might dominate a politician i.e. where   , con…rmation bias always increases the relative attractiveness of a politician when   1 Finally, note that if we use subjective welfare as a criterion, the direct e¤ect ¡(1 ¡ ) in (12) no longer applies, and so con…rmation bias always increases the relative attractiveness of a politician unconditionally.
So, we can summarize as follows.  ln(1¡)¸1  the higher is voter con…rmation bias, the more likely it is that an elected o¢cial is preferred to an appointed one. If voter welfare is measured by the subjective criterion, then it is unconditionally true that the higher is voter con…rmation bias, the more likely it is that an elected o¢cial is preferred to an appointed one.
Conclusions
This paper considers the implications of voter con…rmation bias in a political economy setting. In a baseline model based on Maskin and Tirole (2004), we show that voter con…rmation bias reduces pandering, as it lowers the electoral reward for this behavior by reducing the increase in the probability of being elected from pandering. This result is driven by the fact that the noise aspect of con…rmation bias, which decreases pandering, dominates the bounded rationality aspect. Moreover, as pandering generally has an ambiguous e¤ect on voter welfare, it is possible that an increase in con…rmation bias increases voter welfare.
These baseline results are robust to a number of extensions and changes to the model, for example when the voter observes his payo¤ from the election with some probability, or where politicians vary in competence. Finally, we show that voter con…rmation bias strengthens the case for the case for decisionmaking by an elected rather than an appointed o¢cial. Of course, it is possible that politicians, in addition to voters, might su¤er from con…rmation bias.
There are well-known examples of political leaders ignoring the evidence that policies are not working, when they have strong prior beliefs in the e¢cacy of such policies (Majumdar and Mukand (2004) , CanesWrone and Shotts (2007)). As Mukand (2004) remarks, "a striking aspect of the history of policy-making is the apparent unwillingness of leaders to learn from previous experiments. Political leaders are typically reluctant to change course midway, even if the policy is publicly perceived to be failing". 28 Study of the implications of politician con…rmation bias, particularly the interesting case where politicians vary in this kind of bias and the voters try to infer the bias from the incumbent behavior, is certainly a topic for future work.
A Appendix
Computation of Posteriors. We calculate the posterior probabilities      that the incumbent is consonant conditional on  for the CB and RN voters. The CB voter updates assuming that  =  Given that the consonant and dissonant politicians choose  =  with probabilities      respectively, Bayes' rule gives
On the other hand, the RN voter will update taking into account that  and  are related as in De…nition 2. Then we have:
That is, the incumbent is judged to be of higher quality than the challenger if he chooses  and of lower quality if he chooses  So, from (A3), noting  = 0 we see that the voter of type  re-elects the incumbent i¤ he observes  =  as claimed.
(b) As explained in Section 3.1, the incumbent of either type will pander i¤  · ¢   Given the voter re-election rule, it is clear that for both types
(c) To complete the construction of equilibrium, we verify that 1        0 Given that the probability of pandering is  for both incumbent types, we see that the probabilities that the consonant and dissonant types choose  =  are
1        0 con…rming our initial assumption.
(d) Here we prove uniqueness of the equilibrium that we have constructed.
(i) Assume that the voter only re-elects the incumbent if they observe  but that where one (or both) incumbent types does not follow a cuto¤ rule. But then (say) the ¡type will pander when  =  0  but not when  =  00  for some  0   00  But then the gain to pandering when  =  00 is  (1 ¡ ) ¡  00  which is greater than  (1 ¡ ) ¡  0  which is the gain to pandering when  =  0  a contradiction.
(ii) The second possibility is that voter re-elects i¤ he observes  But then an argument as in Section 3.1 shows that it is optimal for the incumbent to pander i.e. always choose  whenever  · (1 ¡ ) But then, the probabilities that   choose  are are
But then, the voter will not re-elect the incumbent if he observes  a contradiction.
(iii) As the voter does not randomize, the third and fourth possibilities are that voters always or never re-elect the incumbent, whatever  But in this case, both types will choose their short-run optimal actions, whatever  so that   ()      ()  =   So, neither voting strategy can be sequentially rational. ¤ Proof of Proposition 2. Assume for the moment that 0        1 In this case, the re-election probability  conditional on a type  =   incumbent and  iŝ
where  is the c.d.f. of  So, the probability of being re-elected from choosing  =     () is as follows. As       from De…nition 1, the voter will interpret  =  as  =  with probability  so
So, irrespective of the value of  the increase in the re-election probability from choosing  over  i.e.
pandering is
 we see from (A5), (A7) that for the voter with con…rmation bias;
where in the second step, we have used (A1) and in the third, the de…nition of ¢() from (3). In the same way, for the rational voter with noise, we see after some simpli…cation, using (A2), (A7) that
as required. Then, from (A8), (A9) and
as required. Also, we can verify that      exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Finally, proof of uniqueness is as in Proposition 1. ¤ Derivation of Welfare Formula (4). Suppose …rst the incumbent panders. As   05  =  implies  =  , and so the incumbent certainly retained, and so welfare is  + . So, welfare conditional on pandering is
If the incumbent does not pander, voter welfare is computed as follows. First, the objective probability of re-electing the incumbent is the probability that  =  This will be () =  + (1 ¡ ), where
is the probability of retaining the incumbent if he does not pander and the signal  is perfectly accurate. Now By Bayes' rule, the posterior probability that the incumbent is good,
given that he does not pander and is re-elected, iŝ
So,we can write welfare with no pandering as;
Overall welfare is  times the pandering payo¤ plus 1 ¡  times the non-pandering payo¤ i.e. from (A10),
:
Finally, after some computation, using (A11),(A12), it can be shown that
Plugging (A14) into (A13) and simplifying, we get formula (4) as required. ¤ Proof of Proposition 3. This result in the subjective welfare case follows directly from the fact that the indirect e¤ect of  is positive i¤ ¸ from (5). In the objective welfare case, di¤erentiating (4), we
where in the second line, we have used (5). So, for  ¸0  if ¸ from (A15), we also need (ii) Now, consider the behavior of the incumbent. First, given the voting rule, the it is clear that the consonant incumbent does best by setting  =  Next, note that whatever  if the dissonant incumbent imitates the consonant incumbent, he gets  and if he takes his short-run optimal action he gets  +  .
So, the dissonant incumbent will imitate the consonant one i¤  ·  (1¡) so the probability of imitation is  =  ( (1 ¡ )) as required.
(iii) The next step is to con…rm that       But given equilibrium behavior of the incumbents,
(iv) To show uniqueness, we can apply the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2; this part of the proof is omitted. ¤
Online Appendix
Details of Simulations for Table 1 . We assume
So, from (4) in the paper, the equilibrium conditions determining ¢(0) are
where the last two equations are from (A4) in the Appendix. Again from (4), equilibrium conditions determining ¢() are;
Finally, the equilibrium conditions determining ¢ 0 (0) as the same as for ¢(0) except that
Observable Actions and Payo¤s. We begin with a de…nition of con…rmation bias. Throughout, we assume that the voter is optimistic i.e.   05. We will also use the fact that in both of the equilibria constructed below, the ¡type is: (i) more likely to choose  =  than the ¡type; (ii) more likely to generate a payo¤  = 1 than the ¡type So, we say that the voter has con…rmation bias if (i) when only the action is observed, he mis-classi…es  as  with probability   0; (ii) if the payo¤ as well as the action is observed, he mis-classi…es ( 0) as ( 1) with probability   0  =   Our …rst case is where   05. We can then show; Proposition A1. If   05 then there is an equilibrium with the following structure. First, if payo¤s are not observed, the voter re-elects the incumbent if he thinks he observes  =  and if payo¤s are observed, the voter re-elects the incumbent if he thinks he observes either ( 1) or ( 1) Second, the consonant type chooses  =   =   with probability 1, and the dissonant type imitates him with
Proof of Proposition A1. (i) Voter Updating and Re-election Rule. Let () be the voter's posterior probability that the incumbent is good, conditional on  and ( ) be the voter's posterior probability that the incumbent is good, conditional on ( ) where  ( ) are either the action or the action/payo¤ pair that the CB voter thinks he observes. Assume that the ¡type always matches the action to the state, and that the ¡type imitates him with probability   and chooses  6 =  with probability
Then, by straightforward application of Bayes' rule;
and also 
respectively. This is because with deviation, there is no short-run payo¤, but the incumbent is certainly re-elected if only actions are observed, and elected with probability  if payo¤s are observed, because the voter will mis-classify payo¤  = 0 as  = 1 with probability  With no deviation, the reverse is true; the incumbent is certainly re-elected if the payo¤ is observed, and elected with probability  if only the action is observed, because the voter will mis-classify action  =  as  =  with probability  Moreover, in this case, there is a short-run payo¤  So, from (3), we see that deviation never pays, whatever  if
¸05
The second possible deviation is deviating to  =  when  =  By the same argument, the payo¤s to deviating and not deviating are
In this case, deviation clearly never pays.
(ii) Consider now the ¡type. Here, we ask when he will want to imitate the ¡type. Suppose …rst that  =  Then the payo¤ from imitation and short-run optimization are   + (1 ¡ ) +  respectively. So, in this case, the ¡type imitates when  · (1 ¡ ) and so imitates with probability Proof of Proposition A2. (a) Voter Updating and Re-election Rule. Assume that  and ¡types pander -i.e. always choose  -with probabilities      2 (0 1) respectively Also, let      be the unconditional probabilities that   types choose action  We will also assume that      which requires:
Finally, de…ne () ( ) as in the proof of Proposition A1 above. Then, by application of Bayes' rule; 
from  =  and  =  respectively. The …rst payo¤ is calculated as follows. With probability 1 ¡  the voter observes only  =  and will re-elect the incumbent. With probability 1 ¡  the voter will observe ( ) = ( 0) but will mis-classify this as ( 1) with probability  and re-elect the incumbent Similarly, the second payo¤ is calculated as follows. With probability 1 ¡   the voter observes only  but mis-classi…es it as  with probability  and re-elects the incumbent. With probability   the voter observes ( ) = ( 1) and the incumbent is re-elected. So, from (7), the consonant type will pander -i.e. choose  =  when  =  -if  · (1 ¡ 2)(1 ¡ ) and hence the probability of pandering is
(ii) The Dissonant Type. If  =  the payo¤s from choosing  =   are respectively
The explanation is as follows. If  is chosen, with probability 1 ¡   the voter observes only  =  and will re-elect the incumbent, and with probability   the voter will observe ( 1) and will also re-elect him. If  is chosen, with probability 1¡  the voter observes  but mis-classi…es it as  with probability as ( 1) with probability  In either case, the incumbent is re-elected with probability . So, require simply  ·  (1 ¡ ) and so the dissonant type will pander if  ·  (1 ¡ )´   If  =  then the short-run optimal action is . However, in this case, we must check that it is also optimal overall. Payo¤s from  =   respectively are;
The explanation is as in (b)(i) above of the proof. We see that (9) holds i¤  · 05 which is assumed.
So, we conclude that if  =  the incumbent always chooses  
Plugging (10) into (4) and rearranging, we eventually see that      requires
which holds by assumption. ¤ Simulations for the Welfare E¤ect of Con…rmation Bias with Partially Observable Payo¤s.
We compute this for objective welfare. De…ne the re-election probabilities for the two types, depending on whether they pander "P", or do not pander, "N", as
  = (1 ¡ )( + (1 ¡ )) +    = (1 ¡ )(1 ¡  + )
Moreover, we assume  = 1  = 1 implying  = 2 and that  is uniformly distributed on [0 ]  = 3 so from Proposition ??, the pandering probabilities are;
Then, voter welfare is
+(1 ¡   )(1 +   + (1 ¡   )) + (1 ¡ )(1 ¡   )(1 ¡   ) …xed as speci…ed above. Finally, it can be checked that for these parameter values, 
